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Does India think differently?
Western scholars who occupy themselves with Indian thought sooner or later
have to confront the question whether classical India thought differently. The
question is legitimate, even necessary, and does not only concern logic. So-
phisticated Indian thought finds expression in many forms, which we may
designate with the help of Western categories: there are Indian sciences (e. g.
medicine, mathematics, astronomy, linguistics, etc.) and Indian philosophies.
We can call these disciplines »sciences« and »philosophies«, because they re-
semble to at least some extent the Western disciplines we call thus. However,
there are differences, too. This raises the question whether these differences are
significant. Are they due to the presumed fact that India thinks differently, or do
they not justify such a general conclusion, being rather the result of minor
historical coincidences of a kind that might conceivably also have occurred
within the Western tradition of science and philosophy?
The days are long gone when one could ascribe this or that element of Indian
civilisation to the Indian genius, or Geist. We now know that such claims have
usually more to do with projected prejudices than with the culture one is
studying. The temptation is yet great to maintain that there is something spe-
cifically and typically Indian in the systems of thought it has produced, and that
it is possible to say something about the distinguishing feature or features.
One attempt to identify such an underlying distinctive feature has attracted
some attention in recent years. It began, if I am not mistaken, with a remark by
Daniel Ingalls in an article that came out in 1954. Ingalls said there:
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In philosophizing the Greeks made as much use as possible of mathematics. The Indians,
curiously, failed to do this, curiously because they were good mathematicians. Instead, they
made as much use as possible of grammatical theory and argument.
1
This idea was subsequently elaborated by Frits Staal in several articles.
2
Staal
considers the claimed opposition embodied in two historical figures in partic-
ular, Euclid and Pa¯n
˙
ini. He states:
Historically speaking, Pa¯n
˙
ini’s method has occupied a place comparable to that held by Euclid’s
method inWestern thought. Scientific developments have therefore taken different directions in
India and in the West.
3
The idea is that, just as virtually all Western thinkers started their training with a
thorough study of Euclidian geography, Indian thinkers were all trained in the
Sanskrit grammar of Pa¯n
˙
ini. Different models were, so to say, imprinted upon
their minds while they were young, with the result that the thoughts they pro-
duced later on were different, too.
Staal’s proposal is seductive. Unfortunately he makes no attempt to prove it. I
myself have tried to test it against the evidence of Indianmathematical literature,
with disappointing results.
4
If India thinks differently because its thinkers
studied Pa¯n
˙
inian grammar in their youth, this has not persuasively been dem-
onstrated so far.
In spite of this, I think that Pa¯n
˙
ini’s grammar can help us in our quest by
putting us on the right track. I would like to argue that much of Indian thought,
especially philosophical thought, is different and that one reasonwhy this is so is
not that all Indian thinkers had to study Pa¯n
˙
ini’s grammar in their youth, but
rather that many Indian thinkers shared a presupposition that also finds ex-
pression in that grammar. This presupposition can be formulated in very few
words: it is the conviction that Sanskrit is the original and only real language,
which by its nature is closer to reality than any other language (which are all
corruptions of the one real language, Sanskrit). This, at least, was the position of
the Brahmins.
It is perhaps not surprising that Brahmins had this conviction. They dis-
tinguished themselves from other layers of the population by their knowledge of
the Veda, primarily a collection of formulas, all of them in Sanskrit. These
formulas have magical power. If recited by the right person in the right cir-
cumstances they produce effects. They do so by themselves, which shows that
their form, and therefore their language, is closely connected with the outside
world in which they produce these effects.
1 Ingalls 1954: 4.
2 See Staal 1960, 1965 (=1988), 1983, 1986, 1993, 1999.
3 Staal 1965: 114 = Staal 1988: 158.
4 Bronkhorst 2001.
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The Indian Brahmins were not the only ones to think that there is such a thing
as an original language that is closer to reality than any other language. The
ancient Egyptians appear to have thought the same about their language.
5
It is
also known that thinkers (and rulers) in the West have repeatedly attempted to
find an original language, usually by keeping infants in linguistic quarantine and
observing their first utterances. The situation in the West during most of its
history was unfortunately much less straightforward than in India. Western
thinkers were confronted with a number of possible candidates for the original
language. The result was disagreement and confusion. The Indian Brahmins had
only one candidate for being the original language, viz. Sanskrit. This was the
language of their sacred texts, and this had to be the original language.
This one conviction — the belief in Sanskrit as the original and only real
language — explains a number of features of classical Brahmanical thought
which are, as far as I can see, without parallels in theWest. However, the presence
of this unreflected conviction among traditional Brahmins does not explain why
it came to find expression in sophisticated philosophical systems. Vais
´
es
˙
ika
ontology, to give but one example, is built on the assumption that there is a close
correspondence between (Sanskrit) words and things. The appearance of such
systems of Brahmanical thought was linked to external events: Brahmanism
found its ideas challenged by outsiders, primarily Buddhists.
All I have said so far about the special status of Sanskrit was of no concern to
the Buddhists. Buddhism arose perhaps in the fifth century before the Common
Era and did not use Sanskrit until half a millennium later. It used other lan-
guages, but did not look upon any of these as being the original language (even
though it started to do so in later centuries). Buddhism during its early centuries
was engaged in the scholastic activity of collecting and ordering key concepts in
the teaching of the Buddha. At first sight, this religion was not predestined to
develop specific ideas about language. Political events were probably respon-
sible for the fact that it eventually did.
Recall that the North of Indiawas for the first time politically united under the
empire of the Mauryas (ca. 320 – 200 BCE). Recall further that its mightiest
emperor, As
´
oka (ca. 268 – 233 BCE), well-known for the numerous inscriptions
he left, felt strongly attracted to Buddhism. Legendmay be correct in stating that
under this emperor Buddhists moved to remote corners of the empire, among
these the far Northwest of the subcontinent. Other political events — the con-
quests of Alexander of Macedonia just before the establishment of the Mauryan
empire — were responsible for the presence in that region of considerable
numbers of Greeks. Archaeological finds indicate that these Greeks remained
culturally attached to their homeland and continued Greek traditions. This was
5 Borgeaud 2004: 50.
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the cultural ambiance in which the Buddhists of Northwest India found them-
selves.
We have very little information about the contacts between Buddhists and
Greeks during that period. However, what we do know is striking enough to
allow some tentative conclusions. The Buddhists from that region (situated in
what is now Pakistan and Afghanistan) reworked their scholastic lists of key
concepts so as to arrive at a vision of the constitution of the world. They de-
veloped an elaborate ontology that may be considered the first indigenous
philosophical system of the Indian subcontinent. This system was far from
perfect. After all, these Buddhists had to work with building blocks they had
inherited from their scholastic tradition. What is more, they claimed (and
perhaps even believed) that they did no more than correctly interpreting the
words of the Buddha. In spite of these difficulties, they sought to create a co-
herent ontological system.
I cannot discuss the details of this system in this lecture.
6
Briefly put, these
Buddhists claimed that they had an exhaustive list of all that exists : these are the
so-called dharmas, items from the ancient canon diligently collected by their
scholastic predecessors. These dharmas were now given the new function of
being the ultimate elements of existence. It was claimed that all objects that are
familiar to us from experience — including we ourselves — are nothing but
accumulations of dharmas. Since these accumulations are not themselves
dharmas, they do not really exist. Houses, chariots, and even persons like you
andme donot really exist. If we think they do, it merely shows that we aremisled,
misled by our language. We believe in the reality of these objects because there
are words for them.
At this point we have to raise some important questions. First, why did
Buddhists in northwestern India bother to create a more or less coherent system
of thought, where their coreligionists elsewhere saved themselves such trouble?
And second, what is the link between creating a coherent system of thought on
the one hand, and residing in the northwestern region of the Indian subcon-
tinent on the other?
These two questions, I believe, allow of one single answer : These Buddhists
attempted to create a coherent system of thought because they lived in amilieu in
which Greek culture played an important role.
7
One feature of Greek culture
which continued into Hellenistic times is public debate. In a public debate
people defend their opinions against others who disagree with them but are
obliged to listen to arguments. Incoherent views cannot be defended with ar-
guments. People can live with incoherent views, but they cannot defend them
6 See Bronkhorst 2000: 76 – 127, Bronkhorst, forthcoming.
7 Bronkhorst 1999, Bronkhorst 2001a.
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with convincing arguments. If they have to, their incoherent views are soon
replacedwith other ones which introduce coherencewhere therewas none,while
yet preserving earlier notions where possible.
Putting two and two together, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the first
coherent system of thought in Indiawas a Buddhist system, created inNorthwest
India under the influence of Greek culture. Note that I do not say that it was
created under the influence of Greek thought! I know of no Greek elements in
Buddhist thought, nor indeed in any other school of Indian philosophy. I admit
that this may be due tomy ignorance. The thesis I present here has nothing to do
with Greek philosophy, or with Greek thought in general, but only with a Greek
habit : the habit of debate, often public debate.
Does thismean that these Buddhists did not think differently from thinkers in
the West? I would not draw this conclusion in a hurry. The system which these
Buddhists developed was quite remarkable, and may have nothing resembling it
in Western thought. And once again, their ideas about language stand out.
Remember that these thinkers denied the existence of the objects that are fa-
miliar to us from everyday experience. Houses, chariots and persons are nothing
but names. In other words, language plays a gigantic trick on us.
With these Buddhists, a second set of ideas about language enters the scene.
Beside the Brahmins, who thought that their sacred language and the world we
live in were somehow closely connected to each other, these Buddhists from the
Northwest claimed that the world is not at all the way we think it is, and that we
are misled by language into believing that it is.
Unlike the Brahmins, these Buddhists had a coherent system of thought, and
an acquired habit of discussing points of view in public debates. What is more,
Hellenistic influence in Northwest India lingered on for several centuries after
the disappearance of the last Greek kingdoms.Wemay assume that the tradition
of public debate continued under subsequent rulers, and even spread over a
wider geographical area, including regions with a strong presence of Brahmins.
This assumption is confirmed by more recent evidence which shows that the
tradition of public debate had taken roots.
8
Brahmins and Buddhists were
henceforth condemned to confront each other in debate, with predictable con-
sequences: both created systems (if they did not yet have one) which they then
went on refining in ever greater detail. Indian philosophy was there to stay, and
derived henceforthmuch of its impetus from the confrontation between thinkers
with different convictions, primarily Brahmins and Buddhists.
9
This long story of traditional Brahmins and travelling Buddhists was neces-
sary to show that Indian philosophy, both in its Brahmanical and Buddhist
8 Bronkhorst 2007.
9 For details, see Bronkhorst 2008.
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manifestations, was right from the beginning concerned with language. This is
not to say that Indian philosophy is somehow philosophy of language, but rather
that it is based on certain assumptions about language. These assumptions were
not the same for Buddhists and Brahmins, but strangely the thinkers of both
these currents had certain ideas in common. Both believed that the world of our
everyday experience is intimately connected with language. The Brahmins
added that the language concerned was not just any language, but Sanskrit. The
Buddhists from their side specified that the world of our everyday experience,
though intimately connectedwith language, does not ultimately exist, at least not
in the formwe think. But in spite of these differences, Buddhist and Brahmanical
philosophers shared some important presuppositions. These shared pre-
suppositions explain that Indian philosophers from all schools — whether
Brahmanical, Buddhist, or even Jaina— came to spend an enormous amount of
effort on a set of problems that barely figures in the history of Western thought.
These shared presuppositions, let me remind you, concerned the relationship
between language and reality. In its simplest form, they concern the relationship
between words and things. We have already seen that the Brahmins were con-
vinced that there had to be such a relationship. Their philosophers might
therefore argue that such and such a thing must exist, because there is a word for
it. (Do not forget that Sanskrit is an, or rather the eternal language, which does
not allow the creation of new words.) The Buddhists would agree that there was
such a relationship, with this difference that for them the designated objects do
not really exist.
However, the postulate of a close relationship between language and reality
took also a less benign form, claiming an equally close relationship between
statements and their contents. Vedic interpreters concluded from this that the
statements of the Veda, which are eternal and have no author, being pure speech,
have to be correct, i. e. , true to reality. This applies even to the injunctions
contained in the Veda: these are objectively valid commands, which anyone
exposed to them has to carry out; they express objective obligations, which are
independent of anyone’s will or desire.
But even outside the circles of Vedic interpreters, even among those who
attached no value whatsoever to the Veda (such as the Buddhists), thinkers were
convinced that there is a close relationship between statements and what they
say. They held on to this conviction, even when it became clear that it leads to
serious difficulties. One simple sentence can illustrate the nature of these diffi-
culties. The statement »the potter makes a pot« describes a situation in which
there is a potter, there is the activity of making, but there is no pot. Somehow all
Indian philosophers of the period concernedwere convinced that there had to be
a pot in that situation, and that the absence of a pot was irregular and in need of
explanation.
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If you have problems figuring out what exactly the difficulty is in this ex-
ample, then you are close to understanding in what way Indian philosophers
thought differently from you. Thinkers belonging to all schools of Indian phi-
losophy (with the sole exception, it seems, of the so-called materialists)
10
were
perplexed by this difficulty, so much so that they introduced major changes in
their systems of thought whose main or perhaps sole purpose was to resolve it.
11
This led to a variety of new doctrines, from among which every philosopher had
to make a choice. I enumerate some of these:
1. satka¯rya-va¯da, »the doctrine according to which a product (the pot) exists
already before it is produced«: According to this doctrine there is, contrary to
appearance, a pot in the situation described by »the potter makes a pot«.
2. s
´
u¯nya-va¯da, »the doctrine according to which everything is empty«: Neither
pots, nor anything else, can exist.
3. aja¯ti-va¯da, »the doctrine according to which nothing can come into being«:
Since no pot can be made, it cannot come into existence; this applies to
everything else as well.
4. aneka¯nta-va¯da, »the doctrine according to which reality is manifold«: In one
way the pot exists while it is being made, in another way it does not exist at
that time.
5. apoha-va¯da, »the doctrine according to which reference takes place through
exclusion«: Since words do not directly refer to things, the requirement that
there has to be a pot in the situation described by »the potter makes a pot« is
no longer valid.
6. sarva¯sti-va¯da, »the doctrine according to which past and future objects
exist«: It follows that there is a pot in the situation described, even though it is
a future pot.
The last of these six doctrines, sarva¯sti-va¯da, probably existed already before
thinkers started paying serious attention to statements like »the potter makes a
pot«. Sarva¯sti-va¯da is yet entitled to a place in this list, because it came in handy
once this difficulty became the object of serious reflection.
Other solutions to the same difficulty were proposed, too, but the above list is
enough to illustrate my point.
Each of these doctrines offers a solution to the difficulty encountered in the
statement »the potter makes a pot«, and many, perhaps most, were created in
order to solve this kind of difficulty. These doctrines, be it noted, are not mar-
ginal to philosophical reflection in ancient India; they are central to it. The
10 Bronkhorst 2007a: 363 – 366.
11 Bronkhorst 1999a, Bronkhorst, forthcoming a.
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names of some of these doctrines are even used to designate philosophical
schools: Aneka¯nta-va¯da is the philosophy of Jainism; s
´
u¯nya-va¯da is the phi-
losophy of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. One exaggerates, but only
little, by stating that an important part of Indian philosophy consists of answers
to the difficulty encountered in »the potter makes a pot«.
I know that anyone who has ever struggled with an Indian philosophical text
and has been struck by the sophistication of its arguments will wish to disagree
with what I have just said. Let me clarify that it is not at all my purpose to
denigrate Indian philosophy in any of its forms. It should also be clear that no
Indian text states in terms similar to mine that their purpose is to solve the
difficulty connected with »the potter makes a pot«. This does not make my
analysis less appropriate. Complicated and sophisticated thought can hide less
than certain elements, not only in India. Bringing those elements to light may
make them look outlandish, but this was precisely my intention.
Let us return to what I said earlier : If you don’t quite get what difficulty there
is in the statement »the potter makes a pot«, then your lack of comprehension
testifies to the fact that Indians do indeed think differently. To be more precise:
Indian philosophers, during a certain period, thought differently. They thought
differently, not because of their different genius, nor because of different genes,
but because they were part of a philosophical tradition in which certain as-
sumptions were taken for granted which were not taken for granted (at least not
in this same shape) in theWestern tradition of philosophy. Note that no different
logic is involved. It is very simple to formulate the shared presupposition of
Indian thinkers of that period in such a way that their difficulty becomes logi-
cally understandable. It is sufficient, for example, to attribute to them the belief
that the words of a statement must correspond to elements of the situation
described by that statement. This belief runs into trouble in the case of state-
ments like »the potter makes a pot«. We for our part might be inclined tomodify
the belief, whereas Indian philosophers were ready to modify their under-
standing of the world. Logically both solutions are fine, of course. The difference
between us and them is not a matter of logic.
How did it happen that such for us implausible assumptions came to be
unquestionable presuppositions for thinkers frommilieus as different from and
opposed to each other as Brahmanism and Buddhism? The answer to this
question cannot but be historical. I have tried to sketch some of the develop-
ments which led to the remarkable convergence of Brahmanical and Buddhist
ideas about the relationship between language and reality. History might not
have taken this course and this convergence might not have taken place. In that
case the history of Indian philosophy might have taken a different shape alto-
gether. Indian philosophers might still have thought differently, but differently
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in a different way. All that did not happen and we do not need to speculate about
it.
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